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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY F. TYGESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, and 
~ W. SEAY, B. L. CASEY 
and HOWARD RIDGE, its 
Board of Trustees, 
Defendants. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Third Party Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7550 
ROY F. TYGESEN, Plaintiff, appearing as his own 
attorney. 
ROMNEY, BOYER, and BERTOCH, 1409 Walker 
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, appearing 
as attorneys for Defendants. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, appearing as attorney for Third· 
Party Defendant. 
Received two copies this ............ day of ........................... , 1950. 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant. 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY F. TYGESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, and 
P. W. SEAY, B. L. CASEY 
and HOWARD RIDGE, its 
Board of Trustees, 
Defendants. 
CLI~{TON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Third Party Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff for cause of action against the Defen-
dants alleges as follows: 
I 
That the Plaintiff is a taxpayer, real property 
owner, a domestic water user and a prospective cus-
tomer of the Defendant Company, residing within the 
boundaries of an Improvement District known as the 
Magna Water Company, located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
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II 
That the Defendant, Magna Water Company, is 
an Improvement District located entirely within the 
boundaries of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, duly 
and regularly created and existing by virtue of the 
action of the Board of County Commissioners of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, taken under authority of 
Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949. 
III 
That the Board of Trustees is the legally consti-
tuted governing body of the Magna Water Company; 
that P. W. Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge are 
the duly elected, qualified and acting members of the 
Board of Trustees of the Magna Water Company; that 
the Defendant, Clinton D. Vernon, is made a party 
to this action due to the fact that he is the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah and that one of the pur-
poses of this action is to attack the constitutionality of 
a statute of the State of Utah, by authority of which 
a governmental unit is established. 
IV 
That pursuant to and in accordance with the pro-
visions of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, a bond 
election was duly and regularly conducted in the Dis-
trict on March 7, 1950, and as the result of said elec-
tion the Board of Trustees of the Magna Water Com-
pany was and is duly and legally authorized under 
the provisions of the aforesaid statute to issue general 
obligation bonds of the District in the amount of $75,-
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000.00 and to issue revenue bonds of the District in 
the amount of $175,000.00 for the purpose of pur-
chasing the private water system now inadequately 
serving the Magna area and for the purpose of mak-
ing necessary improvements to the system. 
v 
That the above named Defendants, Magna Water 
Company, and its Board of Trustees, are now proceed-
ing with the preliminary steps looking toward the 
immediate issuance of the aforesaid bonds. 
VI 
That the purpose of this Complaint is to challenge 
the constitutionality of a Utah statute, to-wit: Chap-
ter 24, Laws of Uath, 1949, by the use of this extra-
ordinary writ, as provided for in Rule 65 B (4), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; that this extraordinary writ 
is an appropriate remedy to be used by the Plaintiff 
to contest the constitutionality of a statute of the 
State of Utah, or portions thereof, and to arrest and 
prohibit the issuance of bonds in the District in order 
to prevent irreparable damage to the Plaintiff on the 
grounds that such proceedings on the part of said De-
fendants are without, or in excess of, the jurisdiction 
of the said Magna Water Company and its Board of 
Trustees, due to the fact that Chapter 24, Laws of 
Utah, 1949, by authority of which the Defendants, 
Magna Water Company and its Board of Trustees, 
exist and operate, is in violation of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. 
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VII 
That no other plain, speedy and adeqt1ate remedy 
exists or is available to the Plaintiff to provide the 
relief sought herein. That no other remedy provides a 
sufficently speedy relief to meet the emergency con-
fronting the Plaintiff and his fellow residents of the 
Magna area for the follo\ving reasons : 
A. The facilities in the Magna area for the sup-
ply of water to the Plaintiff and his fellow residents 
are perilously inadequate. 
( 1) Construction of new homes desperately 
needed to house the rapidly expanding popula-
tion of the area is arrested by the lack of ade-
quate water supply; the Federal Housing Admin-
istration has refused to guarantee loans on pro-
jected home construction in the area, and the 
Board of Health of the State of Utah has halted 
the further construction of homes all on the 
grounds that the water supply and reserves are 
inadequate to support further housing. 
(2) Recent failures in the water supply system 
of the area have caused numerous homes this 
summer to be without water for periods of sev-
eral hours at a time, and the condition of the 
system threatens a serious health menace. to the 
Plaintiff and to other residents of the community. 
(3) Lack of reserve water supply and the de-
fective undependable nature of the present water 
facilities subject the Plaintiff and the residents 
of the community to the danger of serious fire 
hazards. 
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B. The making of necessary improvements in the 
Magna water system and the acquisition of additional 
water sources for the benefit of the Plaintiff and his 
fellow residents must await the decision of this Court 
relative to the constitutionality of Chapter 24, Laws 
of Utah 1949, and the decision of this Court as to the 
authority of the Magna Water Company to issue its 
bonds. 
VIII 
That said statute is in violation of the law and 
the Constitution of the State of Utah in this: 
A. That the legislature in enacting said statute 
exceeded its constitutional powers. 
B. That said statute violates the provisions of 
Article VI,· Section 29, and Article XI, Section 5 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah in that it dele-
gates to a special commission, private corporation or 
association power to assume, supervis.e or interfere 
with municipal functions, and has by special law cre-
ated a corporation for municipal purposes. 
C. That said statute is in violation of Article 
V of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that said 
statute is so vague and indefinite that were the courts. 
to interpret the same the courts would be required to 
act in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity. 
D. That said statute violates the provisions of 
Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, in this, that the statute does not pro-
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vide for adequate review by the Courts, and in fact 
prohibits or limits review. 
E. That said statute violates Article I, Section 
4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that it 
requires qualifications to vote, and further that it vio-
lates Article IV, Sections 2 and 7 by requiring more 
qualifications to vote in an election than are specified 
in the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
F. That said statute is in violation of Article 
I, Section 7, and Article XIV, Section 3 of the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah in that it deprives a man 
of his property without due process of law. 
G. That said statute violates Article XIV, Sec-
tion 4 of the Constitution of the State of Utah in that 
it enables a city, county, town, school district or other 
municipal corporation to exceed the debt limits im-
posed by the Constitution. 
H. That the provisions of Section 8 of said sta-
tute under subheading "Proceedings on Bond Issue" 
relative to advertising bonds for sale only in Salt Lake 
City papers, is in violation of Article. I, Section 24 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
I. That Section 12 of said statute, relative to 
the sale of water outside the District, is in violation 
of the spirit and intent of the constitutional prohibi-
tion set forth in Article XI, Section 6 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah. Said statute also violates 
Article XI, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah in that Sections 11 and 14 of said statute au-
thorize the Board of Trustees to establish any water 
rates that it desires, whereas the Constitution pro-
vides that municipalities must provide water to their 
inhabitants at reasonable charges. 
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J. That Article I, Sections 1, 2 and 27 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah remind the citizens 
of Utah that every citizen has certain inherent and 
inalienable rights; that all political power is in the 
people and that frequent recurrence to these funda-
mental principles is essential to the security of indi-
vidual rights and the perpetuity of free government; 
that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, is in violation 
of these provisions of the Constitution. 
WHEREFORE: Plaintiff prays that the Court 
issue a Writ arresting and prohibiting the Defen-
dants, Magna Water Company, its Board of Trustees 
and P. W. Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge, in-
dividually and as a board, from issuing any and all 
bonds of the District of any nature whatsoever, and 
for such other and further relief as to the Court shall 
seem proper. 
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1950. 
ROY F. TYGESEN 
Plaintiff 
Received copy of foregoing Complaint this 23rd 
day of June, 1950. 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH 
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, Third Party Defendant 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY F. TYGESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, and 
P. W. SEAY,B. L. CASEY 
and HOWARD RIDGE, its 
Board of Trustees, 
Defendants. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Third Party Defendant. 
ANSWER 
Case No. 7550 
Defendants, Magna Water Company and P. W. 
Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge, its Board of 
Trustees, for answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on file 
herein, admit, deny and allege as follows: 
I 
Defendants admit each and every allegation of 
Paragraphs I, II, III, IV and V and VII of Plaintiff's 
Complaint on file herein. 
II 
Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 
VI of Plaintiff's Complaint to the effect that the pur-
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12 
pose of the Complaint is to challenge the constitution-
ality of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, and admit 
that the extraordinary writ provided for in Rule 65 
B (4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the issuance 
of which Plaintiff seeks in this case, provides the ap-
propriate method to contest the constitutionality of a 
statute of the State of Utah, or portions thereof, and 
that it is the appropriate method by which the Court 
should arrest and prohibit the issuance of the bonds 
of the District should the Court determine that Chap-
ter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, is unconstitutional, but De-
fendants deny that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah, 1949, 
or any part thereof, is in violation of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. 
III 
Defendants deny each and every allegation of 
Paragraph VIII and each and every subparagraph 
thereof. 
WHEREFORE: Defendants pray that the writ 
sought by Plaintiff's Complaint be denied. 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH 
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Received copy of foregoing Answer this 24th day 
of June 1950. 
ROY F. TYGESEN 
Plaintiff 
Magna, Utah 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY F. TYGESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
l\IAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, and 
P. W. SEAY,B. L. CASEY 
and HOWARD RIDGE, its 
Board of Trustees, 
Defendants. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Third Party Defendant. 
ALTERNATIVE 
WRIT 
Case No. 7550 
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in 
this Court on the 24th day of June, 1950, asking the 
Court for an extraordinary writ arresting and prohi-
biting the Defendant, MAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, its Board of Trustees, P. 
W. Seay, B. L. Casey and Howard Ridge, individually 
and as a· Board, from issuing any and all bonds of 
the Magna Water Company, an Improvement District, 
and 
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14 
WHEREAS, Defendants have filed an Answer 
herein rendering the cause at issue, and 
WHEREAS, on the 26th day of June, 1950, the 
Plaintiff, Roy F. Tygesen; the Defendants, Magna 
Water Company, an Improvement District, and its 
Board of Trustees, by and through their attorneys, 
Romney, Boyer and Bertoch; and the Attorney Gen-
eral of the State of Utah, by and through John Bren-
nan, Deputy Attorney General; appeared before this 
Court and they having made oral representations as 
to the purpose and scope of the cause, and having 
asked the court to assume jurisdiction of the cause, 
and all parties having agreed to the issuance of an 
alternative writ, and having agreed to submit the 
matter on Briefs without further oral argument; 
IT IS THEREF'ORE ORDERED that the De-
fendant, Magna Water Company, an Improvement 
District, and P. W. Seay,. B. L. Casey and Howard 
Ridge, its Board of Trustees, individually and as a 
Board, be, and hereby are restrained and prohibited, 
.until further order of this Court, from issuing any 
and all bon,ds of the District of any nature whatso-
ever. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and 
Defendants prepare and present Briefs on the cause 
for the consideration of the Court. The Court there-
upon shall determine whether or not a peremptory 
writ shall be issued or denied; provided, however, that 
the Court may in its discretion require further oral 
argument or the filing of supplemental briefs before 
deciding the cause. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Attorney 
General may join Defendants in the preparation and 
submission of Defendants' Brief. 
Done in Open Court this 26th day of June, 1950. 
Witness the Honorable Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah and the Justices thereof. 
LELAND M. CUMMINGS 
Clerk 
Received copy of foregoing Alternative Writ this 
27th day of June, 1950. 
MARVIN J. BERTOCH 
OF ROMNEY, BOYER & BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROY F. TYGESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAGNA WATER COMPANY, 
an Improvement District, and 
P. W. SEA Y, B. L. CASEY 
and HOWARD RIDGE, its 
Board of Trustees, 
Defendants. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Third Party Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 7550 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In preparing the brief in support of Plaintiff's 
complaint, a summary of the admitted facts. should be 
helpful in arriving at a determination of the issues in-
volved: 
The town of Magna, located in the Southwest por-
tion of Salt Lake County, is not incorporated. It is the 
fourth largest community in Salt Lake County, only 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
being exceeded in population by Salt Lake City, Mur-
ray, and South Salt Lake. Magna is reported to be the 
largest unincorporated densely populated area in the 
United States; certainly it is the largest in Utah. 
Within an approximate one square mile area is con-
tained about 3,500 people, some 1,000 homes, and 100 
places of business. In addition about two to three hun-
dred homes, will be, or are now being, built. 
Magna has a sewer system and disposal plant, 
garbage collection, street lights, street maintena11ce, 
fire and police protection, Justice of Peace court, 
a county recreation program, all furnished by Salt 
Lake County. In addition to these services, the Granite 
School District maintain, operate, and manage the 
schools, the Magna Mosquito Abatement District have 
the responsibility of insect control. Pt1blic utilities 
furnish gas, light, phone, passenger, and freight ser-
vices, and culinary water. In fact, Magna has prac-
tically all services furnished under city government 
except self rule. Magna is governed by the Salt Lake 
County Board of County Commissioners. 
The Pleasant Green Water Compa~y, a private 
corporation regulated by the Public Service Commis-
sion, now furnishes culinary water to the community 
for its domestic needs. Plaintiff agrees that this com-
pany does not furnish adequate service to the commun-
ity in the form of pressure or fire protection. To indi-
cate the status of the present supply, Plaintiff points 
out that a fire occurred in Magna two years ago which 
burned down the Junior High School. Granite School 
District spent nearly a million dollars replacing this 
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structure. It was contended at the time that the lack 
of fire hydrants and water pressure contributed to 
this loss. In any event, Plaintiff agrees that the lack of 
water pressure and fire hydrants in the present sys-
tem constitute a fire hazard. 
Magna is in need of a large number of new homes 
to house present employees of the copper mills and 
smelters. In addition, the copper industry is spending 
millions of dollars on a copper refinery plant which is 
nearing completion. They will employ from 1,000 to 
1,500 additional men. Homes in this area will be 
needed for these new employees. 
On the other hand, the building of new homes is 
now being curtailed for the reason that the Pleasant 
Green Water Company cannot supply the present 
needs of the community, let alone supplying new 
homes. Permits for new construction have been lim-
ited to 54, and 300 or more are needed. 
Plaintiff agrees that the need for an improved 
·water system is urgent, and the program of the de-
fendants in that regard is commendable. However, 
Plaintiff contends that defendants' method of accom-
plishing the same is in violation of law, and that 
sooner or later the courts will determine that Chap-
ter 24, Laws of Utah 1949, is uncostitutional. To do 
so at a later date will cause Plaintiff and all the resi-
dents of Magna irreparable damage. Further, that 
.a determination by this court at this time that this 
act is unconstitutional will permit the Pleasant Green 
Water Company to make needed improvements, or 
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justify other private or public groups to proceed with 
a program that will meet the needs of Magna for an 
adequate water system. 
It is Plaintiff's position that the present trend is 
away from incorporating into cities and towns, and 
vesting more and more power in county governments, 
commissions, and boards, to furnish needed facilities to 
unincorporated areas. Plaintiff concedes that the very 
purpose of the law now being considered in this pro-
ceedings was to permit unincorporated areas of the 
state to obtain adequate water and sewer facilities 
for their communities without being required to in-
corporate. Plaintiff makes no arguments against the 
advisability of such a trend. Plaintiff's only conten-
tion in bringing this action is to have the court deter-
mine how far the legislature might go along this line, 
and still remain within constitutional limitations. 
So far as the present case is concerned, Plaintiff 
concedes that the Magna Water Company, an im-
provement district, was set us in accordance with the 
requirements of Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949. Fur-
ther that the above named defendants are the duly 
elected, qualified, and acting Board of Trustees of 
the MAGNA WATER COMPANY, an improvement 
district. That all steps taken up to the present time 
are in accordance with that law, and if Chapter 24, 
Laws of Utah 1949, is constitutional, then the above 
named defendants should proceed with their program 
of selling bonds and improving the Magna Water Sy&-
tem to a point where an adequate water supply and 
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distribution system is furnished the people of this 
area. 
Plaintiff also admits that there is a dire need for 
this improvement from the standpoint of health, com-
fort, fire protection, and the economic growth of the 
community. It is Plaintiff's understanding that there 
is no dispute as to issues of fact, and defendants in 
their brief will so indicate. 
Plaintiff is his own attorney in this matter, not 
so much from a matter of choice, as expediency. He 
feels that the court should know that as a resident of 
the community of Magna and as an attorney, he has 
for years worked with civic groups and other attor-
neys on legislation that would permit the community 
of Magna to own its own water system without incor-
poration. In this connection Plaintiff has actively par-
ticipated in preparing this law and the law it replaced 
and lobbied for the passage of both laws. After this 
law was passed, Plantiff actively participated in the 
necessary steps leading up to the creation of the de-
fendant Water Company, and the bond election. In 
fact, Plaintiff anticipates a substantial legal fee for 
services rendered, conditioned on this court holding 
this law constitutional. Plaintiff feels that the court 
is entitled to know these facts. 
On the other hand, Plaintiff is extremely anxious 
that the court pass on the validity of this act, and if 
it violates the constitution in any regard, to have this 
court now determine that matter. A decision so hold-
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ing, at a later date, vvould result in costly delay and 
irreparable damage to Plaintiff and residents of 
Magna. 
In preparing this brief, Plaintiff has kept in mind 
his responsibility to the court to submit all matters 
that might be helpful in a determination of the issues. 
Plaintiff has endeavored, with the able assistance of 
a number of other interested attorneys and parties, 
to so do. Any deficiencies of Plaintiff's brief in this 
regard should be charged to his lack of ability, rather 
than to his sincere effort to submit a brief that would 
assist the court in determining the issues here in-
volved. 
In reading this court's recent decision relative 
to the constitutionality of similar laws, Plaintiff feels 
that it would be presumptions on his part to seriously 
contend that these decisions should not be sustained. 
In view of the enormous amounts of monies spent by 
various districts and the benefits resulting to the peo-
ple of the state in such programs in reliance on this 
court's decision, Plaintiff can only agree that the 
trend of the courts and the legislature toward vesting 
more and more authority in these "Quasi-municipal 
corporations" is salutory. 
To indicate this trend toward vesting more and 
more rights and duties in "Boards", and "Quasi-muni-
cipal corporations", see 43 Corpus Juris 12-13 page 
73; and Volume 1 McQuillan Municipal Corporations, 
second edition, paragraphs 134-135 at page 399. It 
appears these quasi-municipal corporations have been 
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created for almost every conceivable purpose and held 
to be constitutional by the courts. 
Unfortunately the courts have made a liberal 
interpretation of the various state constitutions so as 
to hold these laws creating special "districts" consti-
tutional, but have failed to be as liberal in determin-
ing that constitutional limitations on cities, towns, 
and counties should apply to "districts". 
McQuillan (cited above) gives a long treatise on 
the origin of city and town government and traces 
their history to the present trend of vesting more and 
more powers, duties, and rights in "Quasi-municipal 
corporations". 
It is Plaintiff's position that if the court con-
tinues to sustain the present trend toward vesting 
more and more authority in "Boards" and "Special 
Districts", or "Quasi-municipal corporations", then 
the court should establish some standards as to how 
far the legislature might go in these matters and still 
remain within constitutional limitations. In the pres-
ent case, Plaintiff contends that the legislature far ex-
ceeded its authority and constitutional limitations in 
enacting Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949. 
Plaintiff in his brief will attempt to follow the 
objections as set out in his complaint under paragraph 
8 page 3 thereof and refer to them under the caption 
as ·contained therein. (Pages 8-9-10 of this brief.) 
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LEGISLATURE EXCEEDED ITS CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POWERS 
(8A) This of course is all inclusive and the 
contentions of Plaintiff as to unconstitutionality will 
be set out in more detail later. 
DELEGATION OF POWERS TO SPECIAL 
COMMISSIONS 
( 8B) The question of delegation of powers to 
special "Boards" such as in this law "Chapter 24, 
Laws of Utah 1949" has been sustained by this court. 
The makers of Utah's constitution went to great 
length in setting up the powers of cities and towns, as 
well as limiting the power of the legislature to inter-
fere with these powers. Little is said in our constitu-
tion on the powers of county government. It is appar-
ent that in 1895 the makers of the constitution never 
anticipated that the activities of County Commission-
ers would expand to their present status. To illustrate, 
in 1895 activities of County Commissioners was 
minute. Compare that to today's condition. In Magna, 
the Board of County Commissioners control and regu-
late police and fire prot~ction, light the streets, collect 
garbage, surface streets, clear streets and sidewalks 
of snow in winter, put in curb, gutters, and si~ewalks, 
operate the sewer and tell users how, where, when, 
and at what price they can use the sewer. They select 
the men who run the Mosquito District and collect the 
taxes to operate the district. They pass regulations as 
to buildings, license and control business. They even 
number the houses. In fact, the powers of the Board of 
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County Commissioners over the community of Magna 
are almost identical ·with that of cities and town 
fathers over their communities. 
In the law before the court, at Section 1 (2), it 
is provided that a district cannot include cities or 
towns. Accordingly the question under consideration 
must be limited to whether or not this is a delegation 
of powers to "Boards" that should properly vest in 
County Commissioners. 
Utah's constitution is not expansive as to powers, 
duties, and limitations of county government. Article 
VI Section 26 lists a number of limitations on the leg-
islature. (3), (8), (11), (16) particularly apply to 
counties. Section 29 of the same article prohibits the 
delegation of "municipal functions". If the word 
"municipal" is limited to cities and towns, then the 
law before the court is not affected. Plaintiff contends 
the word "municipal" includes normal county func-
tions considered in the light of present conditions. Ar-
ticle XI Sections 1-2-3-4 and 5 relate to county govern-
ment. Again the word "municipal" is used. Section 5 
says no "corporation for municipal purposes" shall be 
created .. The next line specifes that the legislature 
shall provide for incorporation of cities and towns. 
The only conclusion that can be reached is that 
the makers of our constitution intended to distinguish 
between "cities and towns", and "municipal corpora-
tions". 
Again at Section 6 of the same article "municipal 
corporations" is used. Article XIII Section 5 vests in 
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the county power to levy taxes for its own purpose, 
and prohibits the legislat11re from so doing. Article 
XIV Section 3-4-5-6-7 sets up debt limitations on coun-
ties. 
Does the present law violate these provisions of 
the constitution by delegating powers of the county 
in "Boards"? Plaintiff contends that it does. 
At the present time Salt Lake County is actively 
engaged in vestigating the advisability of creating a 
county distribution system for culinary water and 
sewer systems. In vievv of the many expanded activi-
ties of County Commissions, Plaintiff believes that 
the courts would consider furnishing water a part of 
their "municipal function". Now can the legislature 
delegate to a "District" this municipal function? Cer-
tainly the courts would not approve a "District" for 
the purpose of operating the Salt Lake County Hos-
pital, taking care of roads and bridges, making county 
surveys, or. the many, many duties now .carried on by 
the Salt Lake County Commissioners. 
The legislature went into detail in delegating 
powers to counties. In Utah Code Annotated 1943 the 
following is shown: 19-4-1 says counties are bodies· 
corporate and politic and have powers vested and 
necessarily implied. 19-4-2 says county commissioners 
shall govern the county. 19-5-17 authorizes the county 
commission to divide the county into precincts and into 
road, sanitary, and other districts. 19-5-19 says coun-
ties may supervise officials and officers of districts 
and other subdivisions of the county. 19-5-27 says they 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
may license, regulate, tax, and control all activities in 
the county, pass ordinances and enforce them by fine 
and imprisonment. 19-5-28 to 50 inclusive list addi-
tional rights, duties, and powers of county commis-
sioners. 19-5-35 says that they can regulate sanitation. 
19-5-43 provides they may buy, sell, control, and con-
struct reservoirs, dams, canals, and fix the price for 
water. 19-5-50 says they can perform all acts neces-
sary to discharge their duties as county commission-
ers. In fact the reading of Chapter 19 of Utah Code 
Annotated· 1943, and subsequent legislation, clearly 
establishes that the legislature intended to vest in 
county commissioners almost the same powers as are 
vested in cities. 
Plaintiff concedes that the courts have repeated-
ly held the legislature has the power to grant or take 
away powers, subject to limitations of the state con-
stitution. The problem that is presented here is, does 
the limitation imposed by Article XI Section 5 of our 
constitution apply to counties insofar as a water dis-
trict is concerned. Article VI Section 26, at the end 
thereof says, "In all cases where a general law can be 
applicable, no special law shall be enacted". Certainly 
Title 19 is a generalla.w and can be applicable. 
If this law is constitutional, then what powers of 
the County Commissioners are taken away as set out 
in Title 19 Utah Code Annotated 1943. Are conflict-
ing statutes repealed? To illustrate: suppose the coun-
ty wanted to buy the same water supply that the de-
fendants wanted to buy. Who would have priority? 
Suppose the county decided to establish the price of 
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water in the county; then what happens to the pro-
vision of Chapter 24 Laws of Uath 1949 which says 
the Trustees shall set water rates? 
Plaintiff admits that he is at a loss to define the 
meaning of the word "municipal" or "municipal func-
tion" as used in our constitution, nor has he been able 
to find much aid in the cases read. 43 Corpus Jt1ris, 
paragraph 1, page 65; paragraph 3, page 68; and par-
agraph 12, pages 73 and 7 4 deal with the problem. 
McQuilla11 Municipal Corporation, second edition, Vol. 
I, page 383, paragraph 128 deals with this matter. 
43 Corpus Juris paragraph 6, page 70 says a 
municipality is designed to preserve its own type of 
life, rules, and regulations. When it furnishes 11tilities 
it becomes a quasi-public corporation. 
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 43, page 417 says 
counties are "Quasi-corporations for municipal pur-
poses, and the organizing of a county is the vesting in 
the people of such territory, such corporate rights and 
powers". On the other hand, 15 Corpus Juris para-
graph 103, page 457 indicates the legislature has full 
power to enlarge or delete the powers of counties. 
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 277, page 573 indi-
cates that counties have only such powers as are ex-
pressly granted them by the legislature. 
In the case of Leh.i City vs. Meiling, City Recorder 
(Utah case decided July 16, 1935) 48 Pac. 2nd 530, 
the court said, at page 535, "None of the municipal 
functions of the component cities or towns is conferred 
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on or delegated to the Metropolitan Water District. 
Each of such cities and towns will possess and may 
continue to exercise every municipal function it now 
has. There need be no friction between the two, but 
the closest cooperation is contemplated and should re-
sult." 
In the same case at pages 540-541 the court after 
discussing the classifications says "a metropolitan 
water district is not a municipal corporation." Later 
the court says "The characterization 'Quasi-munici-
pal' we think accurate". 
Judge Wolfe in a concurring opinion in the same 
case at pages- 545-49 discusses at length this problem 
of encroachment by special boards on municipal func-
tions. At page 546 Judge Wolfe says "A study of this 
and like provisions in other constitutions reveal the 
fact that it appears in those other constitutions in 
connection with other sections which give it more dis-
tinctly the content of purpose to prevent interference 
by the legislature with local self government, especial-
ly in the matter of such local units handling their prop-
erty, improvements, and money. We believe the fun-
damental purpose of this whole section (Article VI 
Section 29) was to prevent interference with local self 
government". 
At page 548 Judge Wolfe suggests that no public 
agency could be given power by the legislature to tax 
people for purposes of performing municipal func-
tions which a municipality is doing or could do. 
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In the same case Judge Moffat in a dissenting 
opinion classifies these "Boards" or "Districts" as 
a "hybrid entity". He contends they are merely an 
indirect method of violating the constitutional limita-
tion on delegation of municipal power, debt limita-
tions, and other such limitations. He said "The courts 
should carefully scrutinize this 'hybrid entity' and 
rather than determi!le everything in favor of con-
stitutionality, should require strict compliance with 
constitutional limitations imposed on 'municipal cor-
poratons' ". 
In the case of Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dis-
trict vs. Continental National Bank and Trust Com-
pany, (Utah case d~cided October 25, 1937) 72 Pac. 
2nd 1048, the court says an irrigation district is a de-
partment of state government and exempt from at-
tachment or garnishment. Again in the case of Beard 
vs. Board of Education of North Summit School Dis-
trict, (Utah case decided Deceber 10, 1932) 16 Pae. 
2nd 900, the court held that the powers of a district 
are almost unlimited and the courts will not interfere 
with discretionary action of boards. To the same ef-
fect is Salt Lake County vs. Salt Lake City, (Utah 
case decided April 30, 1913) 134 Pac. 560. It appears 
there is no limitation on what the legislature can do 
in delegation of power to "Districts", "Boards", and 
"Commissions". Judge Straup in an opinion of his 
own on the matter indicated that our state constitu-
tion was being broken down and its limitations dis-
regarded. 
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. In the case of Pattereck vs. Carbon Water Con-
servancy District, (Utah case decided January 26, 
1944) 145 Pac. 2nd 503, 106 Utah 55, the court said 
at page 511, "Should a board act in a manner which 
would be unconstitutional there is nothing in the act 
itself which would preclude a person aggrieved from.· 
resorting to the courts to have his rights protected." 
At page 511 and 512 the court says statutory limita-
tions as to corporations for "municipal purposes", sale 
of water, debt limitations, limit on yearly taxation 
"apply only to cities, towns, and villages - and do 
not apply to water conservancy districts. which are not 
municipalities within the contemplation of that term 
used in the constitution". In the same case this state-
ment is made "The legislature had the power to create 
a water conservancy district by its· own fiat. It need 
not have given any .individual or group the right to 
petition for the creation of a district. It was within 
its discretion to determine what qualifications, if any, 
a petitioner for the creation of a district must have, 
since the petition for the formation of the district it-
self do not effect any property rights. Had the legis-
lature created the district it could have provided for 
a tax on all property within the district to pay for 
the costs and maintenance of the project". 
Judge Wolfe in a concurring opinion at page 513 
says "The Plaintiff has assumed that due P.rocess of 
law requires that landowners whose lands are likely 
to be embraced by the district, be given a chance to 
determine whether or not they want such a district. 
This however is not the law". 
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In the case last cited an aggrieved person is as-
sured he can resort to the courts to have his rights 
protected. In view of the present trend of decisions 
relative to these "Districts", a person aggrieved has 
no rights for the court to protect. 
Plaintiff strongly urges that the courts should 
follow the suggestions of Judge Straup and Judge 
Moffat, and clearly set out the limitations of said dis-
tricts, and determine that the word municipal and the 
term "municipal functions" as used in our constitu-
tion should be clearly defined. Further that no special 
law creating districts shoudl be approved where a 
general law vests that power in counties or cities and 
towns; unless the legislature by express and explicit 
direction repeal the general law on the statute books. 
Unless the courts do step in and clarify this matter, 
our statutes will so conflict that no one will know how 
he is governed or by whom. 
Plaintiff seriously contends that Chapter 24 
Laws of Utah 1949 is unconstitutional as being an 
improper delegation of power, the creation of dis-
tricts without limitations, and in conflict with general 
laws already established. 
REQUIRES THIS COURT TO ACT IN A LEG-
ISLATIVE CAPACITY. 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 C) Article V of our con-
stitution prohibits the courts from making laws. It 
is the position of Plaintiff that Chapter 24 Laws of 
Utah 1949, is so vague and uncertain that the courts 
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will from time to time be required to interpret most 
of the statute and in so doing will defeat the intent 
and purpose of the legislature. Plaintiff draws to the 
court's attention a few of these matters that would 
require interpretation by the courts:-
A. · Section 1 provides "and the boundaries of no 
district shall overlap the boundaries of any other dis-
trict". Magna has its own sewer district, with about 
the same area as included in the Magna Water Com-
pany District. The Magna Mosquito Abatement Dis-
trict, the Granite School District, the proposed Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District, all include 
the area covered by the Magna Water Company. Does 
the wordi~g "any other district" refer to these dis-
tricts? Why did the legislature make this limitation-
to avoid overlapping? Dual taxation? Dual regula-
tions? Dual control? 
B. Section 3 provides "where title to any real 
property in the district is held in the name of more 
than one person, all the persons holding title thereto 
must join in the signing of the written protest. Plain-
tiff knows of one piece of property in the district 
owned by five brothers and sisters, and the brothers' 
wives do not appear on the deed. Suppose one of the 
five refused to sign? Suppose a wife refused to sign? 
C. Sections 3 and 5 provide "The deed records 
of the county shall be accepted as final and conclusive 
evidence of the ownership of the real property of the 
district". Suppose the owner fails to record his deed? 
(This actually occurred.) Suppose the owner is dead. 
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Can his administrator, executor, or heir vote? Suppose 
a man is buying under contract and owns 99% of the 
equity? These provisions may be constitutional, but 
certainly are inequitable and discriminatory. 
D. Section 6 provides "The election shall be held 
-in the manner at such time provided by the laws of 
Utah for the holding of elections on the issuance of 
'Court House Bonds by counties'". Plaintiff (and a 
number of other attorneys including Mr. Bertoch, at-
torney for defendants) has been unable to find any 
constitutional or legislative provisions in Utah rela-
tive to court house bonds. 
E. Section 7, "Qualification of voters", pre-
scribes who may vote on the bond election and for trus-
tees. Does "pay a property tax" mean real property -
personal property - auto - income and/or sales tax? 
Does "in the year next preceding the election" elimin-
ate veterans exempt from paying real property from 
voting? 
F. Section 7, "Powers of Trustees", is so gen-
eral in its nature that neither the trustees nor the 
courts could determine the intent and purpose of the 
lgislature. The same applies to Sections 11 and 14. 
The foregoing are set out for the purpose of 
indicating to the court a few of the issues that could 
be raised under this law. If the court should determine 
these issues, would the law still carry out the original 
intent and purpose of the Legislature? 
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Plaintiff is aware of this court repeatedly hold-
ing that matters not properly before the court will not 
be determined. He should like to impress upon the 
court the fact that if the Trustees of the Magna Water 
Company obtain $250,000.00 from the sale of bonds, 
spend the money, incur obligations, etc., and then 
these matters are brought to the attention of the 
court, it is too late to remedy them, and Plaintiff and 
residents of Magna will have suffered irreparable 
damage. 
·Plaintiff seriously contends that if the legislature 
has power to cre~te "Quasi-municipal corporations" 
as is done here, the court should insist that these laws 
should be definite and certain. The constitution is 
explicit in what cities and towns can and cannot do. 
Should not the same be required by "Districts"? 
LIMITS OR PROHIBITS REVIEW BY THE 
COURTS. 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 D) Article I Section 7 
and 11 guarantee to every person his day in court. 
However, this law not only fails to provide for review, 
but prohibits or limits the same. Keeping in mind the 
court's ruling in the Carbon Conservancy District 
case, and the Metropolitan Water District case, Plain .. 
tiff contends that Chapter 24, Laws of Utah 1949 is 
unconstitt1tional in this:-
Generally speaking this entire law vests exten .. 
sive rights in the County Commission and "Trustees" 
but is silent as to any right to review these actions. 
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Specifically, Section 3 provides that a protestant 
has only thirty days to file his protest in the district 
court, and limits the grounds for said review. It pre-
cludes the right to object or go into court after the 
thirty days; even then the district court can only de-
termine whether the property is benefited, and whe-
ther the district was created in compliance with this 
statute. 
Plaintiff draws to the court's attention this fact: 
the only thing the protestant had before him at that 
time was (a) the boundaries of the district, and (b) 
a general statement as to purpose. The last portion of 
Section 3 provides "The provision of the petition shall 
be not considered to be a limitation on the right of 
the Board to submit a bond issue in whatever amount 
and for whatever improvement may be found desir-
able after the District has been organized''. 
Let us assume this hypothetical case. Protestant 
wants a new water supply and favors the general pur-
pose and boundaries. In the resolution the commission 
estimates the costs to be fifty thousand dollars. Pro-
testant thinks that's fine; and endorses the creation 
of the district. Thirty-one days after the district is 
created, fifty property owners present a petition for 
a bond election calling for a bond issue of $250,000.00. 
What happens to protestant's rights to object? Thirty 
days have passed. His "failure to apply for such writ 
of review within said time shall foreclose all owners 
of property within said district as so established from 
the right to further object thereto". 
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Suppose protestant does not agree with the many 
matters the commission may do in calling a bond elec-
tion, such as whether the signers of the petition are 
property owners, sufficiency of notice, is the improve-
ment beneficial, is the extent of proposed improve-
ments excessive, are the boundaries or assessed valua-
tion correct, whether written protests represent half 
the assessed valuation. What can protestant do? "File 
a written protest". The County Commission says by 
resolution, the written "protests so filed represent less 
than half of the assessed valuation of the real prop-
erty in the district". 'The County Commission do not 
even have to have a definite determination of the as-
sessed valution of the district. The statute says "The 
board may require" such a report. Now the legislature 
· steps in and in the final portion of Section 5 says "If 
any written protests are filed, and ·the board shall 
determine that the protests so filed represent less than 
half of the assessed valuation of the real property in 
the district, the resolution or order of the Board call-
ing the election shall contain a recital to that effect", 
and such recital shall be binding and conclusive for 
all purposes. Is that conclusive as to review by the 
courts? 
Protestants' only recourse is to vote down the 
bond issue. It seems that up to this point three county 
commissioners and fifty property owners decide the 
fate of a community consisting of 3,500 people or 
more. The burden of defeating the bond election is an 
excessive burden on protestant. The statute provides 
no recourse to the courts for review. 
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Now the bond issue carries, the protestant is 
lulled into a sense of security by a representation by 
the trustees to the effect "that they will not issue 
bonds for the full amount voted-$250,000.00-and 
points out to the protestant the portion of Section 8 
under "proceedings on bond issue" to the effect "May 
---issue such bonds or such amount thereof as it 
may determine". The "Trustees" proceed to advertise 
and sell the bonds, and in selling them, "shall recite in 
their resolution that they are issued under the author-
ity of this Chapter" (24). The legislature then says 
in Chapter 24, Section 10, "Such recital shall con-
clusively import full compliance with all of the pro-
visions of this Chapter, and all bonds issued contain-
ing such recital shall be incontestable for any cause 
whatsoever after their delivery for value". 
Section 8 under "proceedings on bond issue" pro-
vides "all bonds not issued payable solely from such 
revenues shall be the general obligations of the dis-
trict and the full faith, credit and resources of the dis-
trict shall be pledged for the payment thereof". Sec-
tion 9 says the County Commission must levy taxes to 
pay this obligation. Section 7 under "annual budget" 
provides ''such taxes shall be extended and collected in 
the manner provided by law for the collection of gen-
eral county taxes . . . " "All laws applicaple to the 
imposition, collection, and enforcement of general 
county taxes, including those pertaining to the allow-
ance of collection fees, to the imposition of penalties 
for delinquencies and to the sale of property for non-
payment of taxes, shall be applicable to the taxes so 
levied for the district". 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
Section 14 provides that the Board may adopt a 
resolution for publication as to what the board has 
done. Protestant has thirty days to contest the legality 
of the Board's action, and thereafter "no one shall 
have any cause of action to contest the regularity, for-
mality, or legality thereof for any cause whatsoever". 
Suppose they do not publish the resolution? Merely 
adopt it? 
Plaintiff seriously contends that Chapter 24 Laws 
of Utah 1949 is in direct violation of Article I Sec-
tion 7 and 11 of our constitution, in that it not only 
fails to provide for aqequate review, but in fact direct-
ly prohibits review, or makes possible residents of 
the community being lulled into a sense of security 
until the time to exercise their right to review have 
.. passed. 
In reading cases on this matter Plaintiff found 
these citations that might be helpful: 
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 125 at page 473-474 
says "appeals from decisions of county boards are not 
a matter of right, and are allowable ony in cases pro-
vided by statute". At page 474 it is indicated that no 
recourse can be had to courts where statute provides 
the determination shall be con.clusive. Paragraph 127 
page 475 indicates that a limitation on time to appeal 
a decision of a "District" or county board controls 
and unless recourse to the courts is taken within the 
time specified, the protestant has lost his right. 
On the other hand, this court in the case of Ar-
gyle vs. Johnson, 118 Pac. 487, seriously criticized 
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the "act" there involved for its failure to provide for 
and its limitations on right to review by the courts. At 
page 492 the court said, "When, however, a drain is 
proposed or constructed and an assessment made and 
a tax levied upon such lands, upon the grounds they 
are improved or benefited by such drain, and such 
tax is declared a lien upon the land, to discharge which 
the land may be sold, then the landowner is being af-
fected in his property rights and is entitled to be 
heard before the tax and lien are irrevocably estab-
lished". 
In the same case the court said at page 493 "Such 
laws are salutary and should be reasonably construed, 
and unless violative of some fundamental or consti-
tutional right, should be upheld. In adopting such 
laws, however, the rights of all interested persons 
must be recognized and protected, and an opportunity 
to be heard must be given". At page 493 the court 
suggests that "hearings" be before some disinterested 
parties, not before the one whose acts are being re-
viewed. 
In the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, already cited, 
this court at page 536 said, "The right to be heard be-
fore a competent tribunal on the question of benefits 
is essential to avoid running counter to the constitu-
tional requirement of due process before the imposi-
tion of burdens which might result in depriving a 
land owner of his property by means of special as-
sessments". The court cites the Argyle case as au-
thority. 
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In the case of State ex Rel Ferry vs. Corrine 
Drainage District of Box Elder County, (Utah case 
decided March 27, 1916) 156 Pac. 921, at page 923 
the court upheld the amended law as to a right for a 
hearing and notice being adequate, and in so doing 
the court said, the affected persons were given notice 
of "the starting point or points, route or routes, ter-
minal or termini and general description of the pro-
posed work ... " relative to the drainage canal for 
which he would be taxed. In other words, this court 
said that when a person within the district knew 
where the drains would run, he then would be in a 
position to appear before the commission and be heard 
as to benefits. 
In the matter now before the court, the District 
has been created, the boundaries set, the Trustees 
elected and qualified, and a bond election held where-
in these Trustees are authorized to sell general obliga-
tion bonds in the sum of $75,000.00 for which Plaintiff 
can be taxed, as well as $175,000.00 revenue bonds 
which Plaintiff will help to pay for in the form of a 
water bill. However, up to the present time Plaintiff 
is not advised as to whether the defendants will run a 
new main in front of Plaintiff's home, or if he will 
receive better pressure, or a different water supply. 
No plans are drawn of the proposed improvements. 
No one, including the defendants, know how much 
they will pay to the Pleasant Green Water Company 
for their system; in fact, no one knows whether the 
Pleasant Green Water Company will even sell. About 
one-third or two-fifths of the "District" is farm lands. 
No one lrnows if these farms will ever be improved 
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so as to benefit by the proposed new culinary water 
system. In short, the County Commission held a hear-
ing on the question of whether the district should be 
created. At that hearing they determined all the prop-
erty in the district will be benefited. Since they do 
not have a plan of improvement before them how can 
they know Plaintiff's property will be benefited? How 
do they know farm land will be benefited? Plaintiff 
can make no protest since he knows nothing about the 
proposed improvements. Such a hearing is a farce. 
In the above case cited the statute went to great 
lengths to protect the property owners affected. Ap-
peals from all orders of the commission could be had 
any time within six months after made. The Commis-
sion's orders must be definite and certain. Before any 
taxes can be levied the taxpayer knows the amount of 
tax and the purpose for which it will be used. ·Taxpay-
ers are even mailed notices of the amount of each 
assessment, and a right to be heard as well as a right 
to appeal to the courts for review. Plaintiff here does 
not know the amount of his taxes that will be assessed, 
the water rate he will pay or what the money will be 
used for. 
The same arguments apply to the provisions of 
the Metropolitan Water District Act and the Water 
Conservancy Act. It is understandable that the court 
would hold them constitutional. The constitution, Ar-
ticle XI Section 5 under (A) says " . . . to levy and 
collect special assessments for benefits conferred". 
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A distinction is made in the cases read by Plain-
tiff between the levy of a general over-all tax or ad 
valorem tax, and a special assessment tax. 
In the Argyle vs. Johnson case the court appar-
ently considered the levy to be imposed as a special 
assessment tax and required notice, hearing, and right 
of review by the courts. The court stressed the point 
that where a tax is levied for the improvement or 
benefit of land, the owner is entitled to be heard as to 
benefit before the tax is levied. 
In the case of Whitcher vs. Bonneville Irrigation 
District, (Utah case decided May 2, 1927) 256 Pac. 
785, the irrigation district expanded the district but 
never furnished water. The court said that this was 
a special improvement tax or assessment. At page 788 
this court said "Special taxes are levied on the theory 
that the landowner receives benefits for the taxes 
which he is required to pay". 
In the case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, the court 
considered the act for Metropolitan Water Districts. 
At page 536 the court indicated that taxes levied are 
not assessments for benefits, but is an ad valorem tax 
similar to general taxes and is "not an assessment for 
benefits as such is known in connection with drainage, 
irrigation, and other special assessment districts". 
Again at page 536 the court refers to the distinction 
as to "special assessments". Again at page 536-537 
the court cites with approval a California case that 
held a tax to obtain a source of water was a general 
tax and not a special improvement tax. 
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At page 540 in the same case the court said 
"There is a marked distinction between such districts 
(irrigation, drainage, and mosquito) where assess-
ments may be levied based on the benefits to the prop-
erty included, and a metropolitan water district where 
taxes may be levied on the value of all the property 
within the district". 
In the case of Patterick vs. Carbon Water Con-
servancy District the court apparently ,considered this 
act two-fold, part of the taxes were general and part 
special. The court held the act met the requirement of 
due process, and at page 511 said, "It is the public 
purposes for which a water conservancy district is 
organized that distinguishes it from a drainage or ir-
rigation district. The public purposes for which a wa-
ter conservancy district is organized inures to the 
benefit of the public generally and therefore the public 
can be charged for such benefits through general tax-
ation". 
Again at page 511 the court said, "Classes B, C, 
and D refer to taxes to be imposed for special benefits. 
Sections 100-11-17, 100-11-18, and 100-11-19 provide 
for the voluntary application of municipalities, irri-
gation districts or individuals for the special benefits 
they wish to obtain. These sections contain provision 
for notice to all persons interested and for hearing be-
fore the Board. Section 100-11-21 provides for hearing 
of objections to assessments to be levied and for notice 
by publication to all persons interested. It also con-
tains a provision for appeal to the District Court from 
the findings of the Board. These sections fully provide 
for all the safeguards of a party's rights". 
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In that case the court held unconstitutional that 
portion of the act (100-11-7) denying a right of ap-
peal. 
Judge Wolfe in a concurring opinion at page 513 
said "that no constitutional rights would be violated 
so long as notice and hearing were given on the 
amount of the assessments". Again at page 514 he 
said, "A district could be organized without notice 
or hearing so long as each landowner was given a hear-
ing on the question of whether his lands have been 
benefited and should be assessed to pay for the said 
improvement". I wonder if Judge Wolfe used the 
words "was" and "have" intentionally? At least the 
party being assessed should know the particulars of 
the benefits before the hearing has been had. 
The above case is cited with approval in the case 
of In Re Arch Hurley Conservancy District, 191 Pac. 
2nd 338 (New Mexico case decided January 2, 1948). 
That court cites Carbon Water Conservancy District 
case with approval, but in so doing, at pages 343-344, 
they refer to the act itself to substantiate the court's 
holding, that is "That property within the proposed 
disrict shall be benefited ... " "It is apparent there-
fore that the act makes provision for a hearing as to 
whether or not lands included in the proposed boun-
daries will be benefited". In the same case at page 344 
the court emphasizes these words " ... includes the 
findings of benefits to each and every tract included 
in the project". 
The Carbon Water Conservancy District case was 
again cited with approval in the case of Nebraska Mid-
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state Reclamation District vs. Hall County, (Nebras-
ka case decided February 24, 1950) 41 N. W. 2nd 
397. Here the court at page 407 point out their legis-
lature adopted a water conservancy act similar to that 
of Colorado and Utah and cite the Utah decision with 
approval only after pointing out the detailed protec-
tion given the property owner affected by the act 
itself. 
If this matter of right of notice, hearing, and 
appeal is only given in case of special improvement 
taxes for benefits, then the question arises, is the 
taxes provided by Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 1949 a 
special improvement tax, or a general or ad valorem 
tax? Plaintiff contends the tax can only be interpreted 
as being a special improvement tax. 
Plaintiff can assure this court that if he is going 
to be taxed without receiving direct benefits in the 
form of better water, better pressure, and fire protec-
tion for his home (not his neighbor or the people in 
other parts of the town) then he certainly would ob-
ject to the creation of the district, or at least being in-
cluded in the district. Unfortunately even the defen-
dants have no idea whether such direct benefits will 
ever be furnished Plaintiff or any other particular in-
dividual piece of property in Magna. On the other 
hand, the District was created in December of 1949 or 
January of 1950. The law said Plaintiff must file his 
objections then or appeal the matter to the District 
Court within thirty days. (Section 3 of the Act.) 
Plaintiff can raise no objection now. His thirty days 
have passed. On the other hand Plaintiff even now 
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(July 1950) has no idea as to what direct benefits 
he will receive, or when they will be received, if ever. 
He can be quite sure that the $250,000.00 will be paid 
by him and his fellow residents in the form of taxes 
or increased water bills. 
In this same connection as to whether the tax is 
special or general, the act itself says: "The title is Im-
provement District- the word Improvement appears 
twice in the caption. Section 1 provides for the cre-
ation of Improvement Districts. Section 3 says "de-
scribe the nature and extent of the improvements pro-
posed". The same section provides "In such resolution 
establishing such district, the Board of County Com-
missioners shall eliminate from said proposed district 
any property originally included therein, but which 
it shall determine will not be benefited by the pro-
posed improvement". The writ of review to the dis-
trict court can be based only on the grounds of "no 
benefits" or failure to follow the provisions of the 
law. Through the entire act, the matter of benefits 
predominates. 
Section 5 of the act provides that the resolution 
adopted by the County Commission, among other 
things must contain a finding "that the proposed im-
provement would be for the benefit of all taxable 
property situate in the district". 
Plaintiff contends that Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 
1949 places these taxes in the category of a special as-
sessment. The act itself so describes it. If that be true 
then this act is unconstitutional for the reason it pro-
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vides no right of appeal and in fact prohibits it in 
some cases, and where the right to review is provided 
for, the protestant does not know what the program 
of the Trustees call for and so cannot determine whe-
ther to protest or favor their actions. 
LIMITATION ON RIGHT TO VOTE. 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 E) Our Utah constitu-
tion provides at Article I Section 4, in the last line "no 
property qualification shall be required of any person 
to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this con-
stitution. Article IV sets up additional rights. Section 
7 of this article places limitations on this right when 
it involves special taxes or the question of creating 
indebtedness. 
Plaintiff appreciates that limitations on the 
voters' rights to vote on these issues of special taxes 
or indebtedness have been repeatedly sustained by our 
courts. However, he contends Chapter 24 Laws of 
Utah 1949 exceeds all these limitations and is in viola-
tion of these constitutional provisions. 
Section 7 under "qualification of voters" is dis-
criminatory in this, that a person who owns property 
in the district, but resides outside can vote on the bond · 
0 
ISSUe. 
Only those who have "paid a property tax in the 
district in the year next preceding the election shall be 
permitted to vote" on the proposed bonds. If property 
tax is interpreted to mean "real property" then the 
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limitation ·is certainly discriminatory. If it means per-
sonal property and at1to taxes, then it is more compre-
hensive. If it includes sales tax or income tax, then it 
would permit almost everyone to vote. 
Plaintiff points out to the court this fact. The 
bond issue already approved by the people of Magna 
calls for $175,000.00 revenue bonds and $75,000.00 
general obligation bonds. Who pays the revenue? The 
water user? Can he vote on the issuance of bonds if 
he has not paid a property tax? In addition to this, 
the Magna Water Company has already outlined its 
plan to realize enough money from sale of water to 
meet its obligations and no tax levy is anticipated. 
This is a common occurrence with water companies. 
So the man who does not pay "a property tax in the 
district" and uses water, pays the bill but cannot vote 
on the bond issue. If this bill provided that the bond 
issue would be paid in whole by taxes, it probably 
would not be in violation of the constitution. On the 
contrary, this bill specifically provides at Section 9 
"payments from revenue" " . . . the bonds may be 
issued in such manner as not to be payable from taxes 
but to be payable solely from the revenues ... ". Even 
though the resolution calling for a bond election in-
cluded the above provision, the law still limits the 
voters to those who "paid a property tax". If the con-
sumer of the water is going to pay for the bonds, he 
should have the right to vote at the bond election. 
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NO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 F) The matters hereto-
fore set out and particularly those relative to 8D sup-
port Plaintiff's position that Chapter 24 Laws of 
Utah 1949 are unconstitutional in that a resident of 
the area is deprived of his property without due pro-
cess of law. 
All cases read by Plaintiff support the proposi-
tion that "due process of law" is a vested and precious 
right that should be safeguarded. In the Whitcher 
case at page 789 this court said, "To uphold taxes 
against appellants lands complained of in this pro-
ceeding would result in taking property without any 
consideration or benefit received whatsoever. A mere 
statement of this proposition convinces that it is re-
pugnant to every equitable consideration and falls lit-
tle short of confiscation. As we understand the au-
thorities, taxes under facts such as here appear have 
never been upheld." In that case the court held the 
taxes already assessed to be null and void. Unfortun-
ately for the people of Magna such a procedure would 
be of little help. If these Trustees are permitted to sell 
bonds and spend the money, the damage is done. · 
AUTHORIZES COUNTIES TO EXCEED 
DEBT LIMITATION 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 G) So far as Plaintiff 
can .determine no Utah case on this problem has di-
rectly determined the question of debt limitation as 
applied to· "Quasi-municipal corporations". Utah's 
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constitution is explicit in setting up debt limitations 
on town, city, county governments as well as school 
boards. It is generally accepted that the framers of 
our constitution were anxious to limit the power to 
tax, and the power to incur bonded indebtedness on 
the part of all governmental agencies. 
In the water conservancy act 100-11-16 Utah 
code annotated, the legislature limited the taxing 
power of the district to ~ mill before water was de-
livered and 1 mill afterwards. 
In the case of irrigation districts the legislature 
at 100-9-26 sets a debt limit and any obligation in-
curred in excess is void. 
Under the Metropolitan Water District Act at 
100-10-18-g Utah code annotated 1949 the legislature 
prohibits any indebtedness of the district to exceed 
ten per cent of the assessed valuation. 
Under the Mosquito Abatement District Act, no 
provision is made for bonded indebtedness of any kind, 
and the legislature at 56-0-9 Utah code annotated 
1943 specifies the tax rate, "and in no event shall such 
tax exceed ten cents on each one hundred dollars of 
taxable property in such district". 
Article XIII Section 7 and 9 limits rate of tax-
ation. Article XIV determines public debt limit. 
Plaintiff can find no direct limitation imposed 
by our constitution as to debts incurred by "Quasi-
municipal corporations". However, it seems unthink-
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able that the makers of the constitution even con-
sidered the possibility of creating districts without 
some limit as to their taxing power or amount of in-
debtedness they could incur. 
It appears that so far as Utah is concerned the 
legislature has set up debt or tax limitation or both 
on these "Districts" when created. Presumably there 
is no constitutional limitation on the taxing power or 
debt limitations of distrcts other than that imposed 
by the spirit rather than the letter of the constitution. 
15 Corpus Juris paragraph 277 page 573-574 
deals with the problem of debt limitation. In the case 
of Lehi City vs. Meiling, already cited, this court at 
page 538 said, "The total sum to which a district 1nay 
obligate itself to pay must be within the limits fixed 
by statute". In other words, the direct obligation and 
conditional or surety obligation should be computed 
together as a debt of the district and the total amot1nt 
should not exceed the statutory limitation". 
At pages 540 to 544 inclusive, the court extel1-
sively discusses the matter of debt limitation, and 
holds that the debts of the distrct are not a part of 
city or county debts. At page 542 the court said, "It is 
true the framers of the constitution feared debt and 
wisely attempted to place restrictions on the govern-
mental subdivisions so they could not incur indebted-
ness in such amount as to lead to. insolvency". 
Judge Moffat and Judge Hansen in the Lehi City 
vs. Meiling case contend that the creation of these 
"hybrid entity" districts are merely an indirect 
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method of violating constitutional limitations on debt. 
In the Carbon Water Conservancy District case, Judge 
Moffat reiterated this position, and said, "Flexibility, 
adaptability, development, and stability of law are de-
sirable. The paths of growth and adaptability are of-
ten devious, but should not be used to evade constitu-
tional provisions". 
The question of debt liability and the maximum 
amount of taxes that can be levied are of paramount 
interest to the water user or resident of the district. 
The Trustees under Section 11 have ''the power to 
cause to be levie1d as above provided, taxes on all tax-
able property in the district for the carrying out of 
the purposes for which the district is created; pro-
vided, however, that the taxes so levied for any dis-
trict, other than those levied for the pa,yment of prin-
cipal of and interest on the bonds of the district, shall 
not in any year exceed 4 mills on each dollar ... " 
In other words the Trustees can levy up to 4 mills 
for the carrying out of the purpose of the district or 
operation costs. No limitation of any kind is shown 
as to the amount of taxes the Trustees can impose to 
meet the payment of general obligation bonds and 
interest. 
Let's assume a concrete example. Assume the as-
sessed valuation of the Magna Water Company is one 
million dollars. ·The Trustees have already been au-
thorized at the recent bond election, to issue general 
obligation bonds for $75,000.00. They can use their 
own judgment as to when they will repay interest and 
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principal (see Section 9). Assume further they issue 
all these bonds payable annually over a ten year period 
with interest at five per cent or interest for the ten 
year priod of about one-fourth the bond issue or $15,-
750.00, a total of $93,750.00. The Trustees could agree 
to pay back general obligation bonds and interest in 
ten years at the rate of $9,375.00 per year. On a one 
million dollar assessed valuation, this would mean 
aboue nine and one-third mills per year. Under this 
same statute the Trustees could levy an additional 
four mills per year for operation costs, or a total an-
nual levy of 13 1/3 mills. 
In examining Plaintiff's last year's tax notice, 
I find I am taxed under six different categories on 
my real property. This does not include personal prop-
erty tax, auto, licenses, livestock, etc., nor does it in-
clude the tax referred to above for taxes imposed by 
the Magna Water Company. Incidentally, all of the 
taxes referred to are collected by Salt Lake County. 
The makers of our constitution in 1895 were con-
cerned about taxes and debts. Plaintiff is vitally con-
cerned, especially around November of each year. In 
fact the matter of taxation is a serious one in our na-
tion today. On the other hand this court has approved 
drainage districts, irrigation districts, water conserv-
ancy districts, and metropolitan water districts. Un-
der this court's rulings to date, the power of the legis-
lature to pass laws permitting additional districts, or 
even creating them of their own volition, seems to have 
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no limitation. If this trend continues, the county will 
not have to take Plaintiff's home for taxes - he will 
give it to them. 
Under the provisions of Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 
1949 the Trustees must set Plaintiff's water rate at a 
figure that will pay off $175,000.00 worth of revenue 
bonds plus interest for some twenty years. The Trus-
tees have already indicated my water rate would be 
twice that now charged by the Pleasant Green Water 
Company. When the water rate reaches a figure Plain-
tiff cannot afford to pay, the Trustees shut off his 
water. Plaintiff is not so sure this statute does not 
vest power in the Trustees to deprive Plaintiff of a 
vested right without due process, since the Trustees 
set the water rate without being required to have a 
hearing on the matter, nor is the right for court re-
view provided by this law. 
Plaintiff appreciates that this court in the Car-
bon Water Conservancy District case held that the 
debts of .the district could not be considered the debts 
of the participating cities and towns. However, in al-
most all of these districts and particularly in the act 
now before the court, the "district" is a creature of 
the County Commission. They declare their intention 
to create a district, set the boundaries and purpose, 
hold the election, collect the taxes, and the County 
Clerk and County Treasurer can act in that capacity 
for the district. The district merely acts for and in 
behalf of the County Commission to carry out a right 
and duty of the county. Plaintiff seriously contends 
that the court should hold that the Magna Water Com-
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pany is merely a department of County government, 
subject to county debt limitations and all other limita-
tions expressed or implied in our constitution appli-
cable to municipal corporations. 
IS A SPECIAL LAW 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 H) The last line of Sec-
tion 8 provides that notice of the bond sale shall be in 
a paper published in Salt Lake City. This in direct 
violation of Article I Section 24 of our constitution, 
and Article VI Section 26. 
AUTHORIZES SALE OF WATER 
OUTSIDE DISTRICT 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 I) Section 11-12 IS In 
conflict with the spirit and letter of the constitution 
permitting sale of water of the district outside its 
own boundaries without limitation, and is in viola-
tion of Article XI Section 6 of the constitution. It will 
be noted that the constitution uses the words "No mu-
nicipal corporation". They do not use the words "cities 
or towns". Section 5 of the same article refers to "Cor-
poration for municipal purposes". In the same section 
they specify "cities and towns", indicating their in-
tention to make a distinction. Again Section 6 Article 
XI of the constitution provides "But all such water-
works, water rights, and sources of water supply now 
owned or hereafter to be acquired by any Municipal 
Corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and oper-
ated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at 
reasonable charges. Is it not a fair interpretation that 
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this wording "municipal corporation" was intended to 
refer to a district or "Quasi-municipal corporation" 
of the type under consideration? The Magna Water 
Company is created for the sole purpose of supplying 
its residents with an adequate water supply and sys-
tem, the same as a city or town. Chapter 24 Laws of 
Utah 1949 specifically authorizes sale of water out-
side the district. 
In this same connection, relative to express pow-
ers vested in the Trustees by this statute, Section 7 
under the sub-head of "Powers of Trustees" provides 
for compensation of Trustees and then provides "A 
Trustee may be employed as. general manager of the 
properties of the district at such additional compensa-
tion as may be fixed by the other two trustees, and 
when so employed he shall continue to perform the 
duties of Trustee". This provision is in violation of 
the spirit and letter of the constitution and laws of 
Utah. 
Our constitution, Article VI Section 26 ( 18), and 
Section 30 prohibits this type of legislation. 15 Corpus 
Juris paragraph 162, 163 page 497 and 498 deals with 
this matter and at 15 Corpus Juris paragraph 131 
page 4 77 this appears: "On the ground of public pol-
icy, and because of express statutory prohibition in 
some states, a county board cannot contract directly 
or indirectly with one of its own members. A contract 
so made is void". 
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57 
DEPRIVES CITIZENS OF INALIENABLE 
RIGHTS 
(Plaintiff's complaint 8 J) "To secure and per-
petuate the principles of free government", "frequent 
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential." 
In conclusion, Plaintiff strongly contends that 
Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 1949 should be co11strued 
by this court to be "in violation of the intent of the 
constitution and is inconsistent with the spirit and 
true intent of the same." (The quoted words are Judge 
Wolfe's, not Plaintiff's.) Further that the matters 
pointed out in 8B-8D-8F -8G-8H- and 81 of Plaintiff's 
brief are in direct violation of express limitations con-
tained in the constitution. 
Plaintiff realizes that this court has heretofore 
ruled on most matters raised herein by Plaintiff. How-
ever, a comparison of the statutes relating to drainage, 
irrigation, water conservancy, and the metropolitan 
water district, with Chapter 24 Laws of Utah 1949 
will clearly show a marked difference as to matters 
raised by Plaintiff in his brief. Plaintiff's position is 
that the decisions of this court relatve to these various 
districts can be easily reconciled so as to hold this act, 
now before the court, unconstitutional, without ma-
terially affecting the decisions referred to. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROY F. TYGESEN 
Plaintiff. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
